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In the early twentieth century, most American public companies had a partner or director from a top-ranked
investment bank on their boards. Market participants generally believed that the banker-directors of that era
monitored company management on behalf of outside investors, and the privileged information the bankers
obtained in their directorships enabled them to distribute their clients’ securities on more favourable terms. The
underwriting business was quite concentrated, and the substantial market shares of major investment banks gave
them a strong incentive against colluding with management to market securities of dubious value, since that would
tarnish their reputations, and their future business.
Yet this concentration also raised a number of concerns. A small group of investment banking firms held
directorships with nearly all major American public companies, giving them an extraordinary degree of influence over
the economy. Often partners from the same bank held board seats with competing firms, which presented
opportunities to facilitate collusion among their clients. And the cartel-like structure of the investment banking
business itself raised concerns that a small number of firms held total control over access to finance, and may have
been able to charge exorbitant fees for their services. The dual position of underwriter and director held by many
investment bank partners created significant conflicts of interest.
Such concerns about the role of bankers in the economy led to an investigation in the U.S. Congress of the “money
trust” in 1912. Ultimately, this led to the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, which included a number of
regulations designed to restrain the power of financiers. Among them was its Section 10, which prohibited the
securities underwriters of railroads — the largest and most important companies of their time — from holding seats
on their boards. This statute presents an ideal opportunity to investigate whether railroads benefitted from having
investment bankers on their boards, or whether the conflicts of interest inherent in the role of their banker-directors
harmed railroads’ investors.
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Section 10 was not implemented in 1914, but was repeatedly postponed by Congress and only went into effect in
1921. To comply with the law, underwriters could either resign from the boards of railroads, or retain their
directorships and stop providing underwriting services. Some investment bankers stepped down from the boards of
railroads prior to 1921 in anticipation of the law, but the major change occurred in the years immediately following
the implementation of Section 10. On average, NYSE-listed railroads lost one investment banker from their boards
during that period, as bankers resigned to comply with the law.
Using new accounting data we assembled for the years 1905-29, we find that railroads with stronger preexisting
relationships with their underwriters experienced a decline in their investment rates, valuations, and leverage, as
well as an increase in their average interest rates in the years following 1921. For the latter three outcomes, the
effects were equivalent to 2 to 5 per cent of the variables’ 1920 means. The effect on investment rates was larger —
a 28 per cent decline relative to the mean 1920 rate. This evidence is consistent with banker-directors helping to
relax railroads’ financial constraints. The increase in interest costs and decline in valuations directly contradict the
views of the supporters of the Clayton Act, who argued that banker control harmed railroads by raising their interest
costs and encouraging them to make inefficient investments.
In order to verify that these changes were indeed caused by Section 10 of the Clayton Act, rather than other events
affecting railroads or their relationships with investment banks, we performed the same analysis on industrial firms
and utilities, which were not subject to the regulations of Section 10. We find no effects of close ties to underwriters
on those firms’ performance in the years following 1921.
We also investigate the mechanisms behind these effects. We find that railroads with close relationships with
underwriters suffered to a greater extent when they had a substantial amount of debt maturing in the years
immediately following 1920, or when they had relationships with the highest-ranked investment banks. These
findings suggest that problems in accessing capital markets created by the legal disruptions to bank-firm
relationships are the likely mechanism behind our results.
The prohibitions of Section 10 encompassed other forms of self-dealing by railroad directors, such as the purchasing
of inputs from affiliated firms. We find that the valuations of railroads that had maintained board interlocks with
capital equipment suppliers rose somewhat in the years following the implementation of Section 10, indicating that
self-dealing in supply contracts may have harmed the railroads. The authors of Section 10 also hoped to reduce the
ability of banker-directors to facilitate collusion, since many bankers held multiple railroad directorships. Yet
interlocks with competitors created by underwriters had no differential effects following the implementation of
Section 10.
The implications of our findings from the 1910s and 1920s for modern firms may depend on the context. It is far less
common for major American corporations to have bankers on their boards today, and some evidence suggests that
banker-directors exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, agency problems for them (Guner, Malmendier and Tate,
2008). Thus, relationships with intermediaries apparently do not serve the same role today as they did in the early
twentieth century.
The dramatic evolution of American financial markets and regulatory frameworks since the 1920s may explain this
difference. Investors today have stronger legal protections and greater access to information than they had prior to
the advent of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the early twentieth century, investors trusted reputable
investment banks to defend their interests to a much greater extent than corporate managers. This suggests that
our results may be most relevant to countries with limited protections of investors. In such environments, affiliations
with financial intermediaries that can effectively act as monitors may ease firms’ financial constraints, and contribute
to economic growth more generally.
The results of our paper also provide new insights into the effects of rules intended to address conflicts of interest.
Railroads were made better off by the prohibitions against self-dealing in equipment supply contracts, suggesting
that the benefits from relationships with suppliers (such as a timely delivery of high quality inputs) were not large.
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But Section 10 of the Clayton Act was motivated by a theory that bankers used their influence over railroads’ access
to finance to enrich themselves at the expense of other investors. In its attempt to address the conflicts of interest
inherent in the bankers’ positions as corporate directors, Section 10 disrupted relationships between underwriters
and railroads that had developed in order to facilitate valuable flows of information, and to constrain powerful
insiders.
Restricting these relationships ultimately harmed most of the firms and investors that the regulation was intended to
protect. Our empirical analysis does not measure the potential effects of this regulation on other economic agents,
and we therefore cannot estimate the general welfare effects created by Section 10. However, our findings do
suggest that legal prohibitions or rules aimed at safeguarding against conflicts of interest that arise in the economy
more generally can have substantial economic costs, particularly if they disrupt the flow of information often inherent
in these transactions.
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